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Abstract Commentary was an important vehicle for philosophical debate in 
late antiquity. Its antecedents lie in the rise of rational argumentation, polemical 
rivalry, literacy, and the canonization of texts. This essay aims to give a historical 
and typological outline of philosophical exegesis in antiquity, from the earliest alle-
gorizing readings of Homer to the full-blown “running commentary” in the Pla-
tonic tradition (fourth to sixth centuries CE). Running commentaries are mostly on 
authoritative thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle. Yet they are never mere scholarly 
enterprises but, rather, springboards for syncretistic clarification, elaboration, and 
creative interpretation. Two case studies (Galen 129–219 CE, Simplicius ca. 530 CE) 
will illustrate the range of exegetical tools available at the end of a long tradition in 
medical science and in reading Aristotle through Neoplatonic eyes, respectively.
1. Exegesis and Commentary: The Birth of a Genre?
Exegesis, broadly defined as the act of interpretation—the attempt to clar-
ify an existing text, spoken or written—took a long time to reach matu-
rity. The earliest attested evidence from ancient Greece illustrates how the 
practice of elucidating the meaning of an entire narrative or its supposedly 
I would like to thank Peter Adamson (Philosophy Department, King’s College London) and 
the readers of Poetics Today for helpful comments on the final drafts, the guest editor Jonathan 
Lavery for the opportunity to write on this topic and his support during the editorial process, 
and the Faculty of Humanities, Adelaide University, for financial support (URG 2003) of 
work on section 4.3 and Baltussen forthcoming c.
Poetics Today 28:2 (Summer 2007) doi 10.1215/03335372-2006-022
© 2007 by Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics
248 Poetics Today 28:2
unclear parts grew almost organically. Gradually, innovations in method 
and strategy accumulated to form a rich textual tradition: first in religion 
(by so-called exêgêtai ) and poetry, then in philosophical accounts of the 
cosmos, and finally in the metalanguage of commentators of late antiquity. 
By the end of this period, there was a rich trove of structurally complex 
texts whose guiding purpose was to clarify existing scientific, literary, and 
philosophical narratives.
 In this essay, I shall sketch both the emergence and the development 
of exegesis, which culminated in the genre of commentary (its full-blown 
technical instantiation), by focusing on clear examples of writings in which 
one author engages with the writings of earlier authors in order to clarify 
the thoughts contained in them. Unhappily, even mature commentaries 
have recently been characterized as “secondary texts” (Sluiter 2000). I will 
argue that this label is problematic in so far as it is likely to create mis-
conceptions about how we should understand the nature of philosophi-
cal commentary as one specialized form of exegesis. It is important not 
to understand “secondary” as “unimportant,” “subservient,” or “unorigi-
nal.” I hope to show that the commentary in late antiquity defies such 
facile descriptions. I will also argue that we will understand the mature 
form better if we first look at the stages leading up to formal commentary, 
in particular by paying attention to the role of polemic as a formative fac-
tor in the development of interpretive strategies. The linear progression 
presented here is imposed for the sake of exposition and clarity and should 
not be taken as an argument for linear evolution. Given its scope, this essay 
can only provide a selective and incomplete account as a first step toward 
a history of the ancient philosophical commentary.
 My aim, then, is twofold: one, to offer a compact history of exegesis in 
Greco-Roman antiquity. This history will outline the relevant chronologi-
cal progression, beginning with the incipient activities of exegesis and the 
preconditions for the interpretation of texts as an established practice, then 
elaborating on the mature, formal, and distinct genre of the running philo-
sophical commentary. And, two, to provide a typological account which 
describes the evolving variants of commentary from its Presocratic roots 
to late ancient scholarly texts. On the basis of this combined historical and 
typological account, we should be well-placed to see the fluid and progres-
sive interaction between form and content within the genre. The particular 
1. From the perspective of interpretation “which takes control and . . . remakes its object 
in the very act of its subservience,” McCarty (2002: 363) has declared the commentary “pri-
mary” in relation to the text commented on.
2. Space prevents me from dealing with ancient rabbinic exegesis/commentary on the 
Bible, with which there are interesting points of contact; see Levinson 2004.
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nature of the formal commentary as a responsive medium for philosophi-
cal engagement, in which one text interacts with another text in a relation 
that is driven by didactic and systematic motives, brings into focus how 
the notion of authority came to lie at the heart of the commentary tradi-
tion. The choice of a particular text as carrying an important philosophical 
message accords it special status and authority, which, as we shall see, can 
be both challenged and defended.
 The emphasis on polemic and exegesis as central terms in this account 
(including my title) may need some justification. Unlike standard accounts, 
I aim to capture the dynamic nature of the tradition in referring to the full 
spectrum of formal and nonformal acts of interpretation; commentary is 
not a fixed entity through time. My preference for the generic term exegesis 
over commentary also serves as a measure against equivocation: commen-
tary will be used in a more restricted sense, as a developed, formal ver-
sion of exegesis. The modern understanding of “commentary” tends to 
evoke the practice of providing a sustained and comprehensive annotation 
to a text according to high standards of scholarly rigor. My more inclusive 
approach, as expressed by exegesis, also accommodates early interpretive 
activities not covered by commentary. But there is a more fundamental rea-
son to avoid the modern notion of commentary for the material I want to 
discuss. Whereas in most cases a modern commentary tends to be an end 
in itself, producing a set of disparate notes to a text and lacking a unifying 
principle of its own (a “plot”), the ancient philosophical commentaries 
emerging after the first century BCE tend to serve a higher purpose (philo-
sophical understanding and truth) by way of interpreting the thoughts of 
a scholar. This holds indisputably for the Platonic tradition, from its first 
observable example (anonymous commentary on Theaetetus, first century 
BCE) to commentaries that were written as late as 700 CE.
 Needless to say, this approach requires us to put aside the modern 
notion of commentary as a formal type of writing with the sole purpose 
of explicating another text from start to finish (cf. note 45), especially in 
light of the fact that a literate social context, in which written texts are 
central, was a fairly late development in ancient culture. Only a literate 
context could generate the requisite technical terminology, foster chal-
lenges to tradition and religious authority, and help unearth underlying 
assumptions in formerly oral reflexes. The development I present uses 
3. Most (2005: 169) signals that the current view of scholarly commentary is changing: “Per-
haps for the first time in a hundred generations, the commentary is no longer being taken 
for granted as self-evidently the noblest expression of the study of texts.”
4. The increased awareness of traditional thought patterns is crucial to the rise of second-
order discourse. This position, further developed in this essay, emerges from inquiries into 
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examples which are each meant to be representative of distinct stages. I 
will outline the earliest stage of emerging exegetical activity and then go 
on to discuss a few important steps toward the development of philosophi-
cal exegesis of a more scholarly nature. Two case studies, one of the great 
physician and philosopher Galen (129–219 CE), the other of the late Pla-
tonist Simplicius (ca. 530 CE), will illustrate the levels of sophistication 
evident in later examples of the formal ancient philosophical commentary. 
The result should be a historical and typological narrative which describes 
and analyzes an increasingly self-conscious activity in its evolution from 
humble beginnings to complex maturity. This promises to give a unique 
insight into the first attempts at exegesis and the formative stages of its 
development.
2. The Nature and Origin of Exegesis
The act of interpretation is as old as language itself and an essential part 
of communication. Understanding the meaning of words, whether spoken 
or written, is of perennial importance. Language is used to make sense of 
the world, as a basic human activity for finding meaning in and sharing our 
experiences. Stories about the gods and their role in the cosmos clearly 
served this purpose for the earliest civilizations. At some point, when 
the level of sophistication in our modes of expression and communica-
tion had increased far beyond the needs of mundane and practical usage, 
texts became more complex, and so, as a corollary, did our strategies of 
interpretation.
 Semantic analysis, in order to make sense of words, is not much different 
from making sense of the world, though clearly it is more of a second-
order activity, words clarifying words. Three antecedent conditions were 
important for the rise of this second-order operation: a body of “literary” 
works (oral or written), a community with a shared “literature,” and an 
understanding of the difference between literal meaning versus nonliteral 
meaning. The oscillation between these factors is a constant from the earli-
est cases of “literary criticism.” Allegorization of Homer’s epics can be 
dated to the sixth century BCE, when the first philosophical interpreta-
tions were emerging together with some of the playful literary responses to 
the Homeric language found in the early lyrical poets, such as Archilochus 
and Pindar (Nagy 1990, Obbink 2003). Early literary and philosophical 
engagement with the central text of preliterate Greek culture is discernible 
the rise of literacy (e.g., Havelock 1982 [1966]; Ong 1982; Thomas 1992) and the first known 
philosophical interpretations of religious texts ( Janko 2002–3; Obbink 2003, Betegh 2004).
5. For a similar point see Yunis 2003: 189.
Baltussen • The Ancient Philosophical Commentary 251
in small traces, providing evidence of a surge in exegetical activities in the 
late archaic and early classical period (ca. 750–450 BCE).
 As literacy was the privilege of very few people in a predominantly 
oral world, advanced exegetical activities were closely connected to well-
educated aristocrats active in public life (politics and religion) and are 
likely to have arisen in making sense of laws, riddles, and oracles (Robb 
1983). These involved the earliest “acts of exegesis” in ancient Greece. 
For instance, oracles from Delphi, famous for their ambiguity, represented 
the shrewdness of politically informed priests, whose advice could topple 
empires and destroy cities. “Disambiguating” these riddles thus became 
a major part of decision making, and the greater one’s aptitude at distin-
guishing various meanings, the better one would be at producing possible 
interpretations. In the Derveni papyrus, which offers an allegorical inter-
pretation of an Orphic religious poem (Betegh 2004), Orpheus is said to 
offer “important things in riddles” (expressed in the word hierologeitai, liter-
ally “tell a holy tale”; see Janko 2002–3: 5). Secrecy befits the sacred.
 But the language of everyday life became inadequate to express the 
supposed deeper meaning of Hesiod’s didactic poetry or Homer’s epics. 
Homer exegetes (“Homeridae”) appear quite early on, claiming him as 
their ancestor as early as the sixth century BCE. The ironic portrayal of 
a rhapsode in Plato’s dialogue Ion (fourth century) gives us some sense 
of the style and approach of these Homeric “experts,” even if the self-
presentation of the protagonist (Ion 530c, hermêneus [“interpreter”]) and his 
confidence in knowing what Homer means must not be taken at face value. 
The Homeric “text” sung by the bards could attract interpreters in differ-
ent ways: the formulaic style gave bards some freedom in composition, 
allowing for individual differences in presentation of events, characters, 
and emotions—the first signs of reinterpreting a text creatively. It has even 
been suggested (Zwierlein 2002: 89, after Pfeiffer 1978) that Homer prac-
ticed “self-interpretation”: for instance, by providing etymology to clarify 
names, a suggestion already made by the Stoic Zeno in the third century 
BCE (cf. below, section 3).
 Only when the text was written down (750/700 BCE?) would new prob-
lems arise, since multiple versions of a text could now undermine certainty 
about the content or raise questions about which is the “correct” version. 
The fragmentary evidence on allegorical and cosmological interpreta-
tions of Homer dates to the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, starting, so far 
6. On oracles and bards see, e.g., McLeod 1961, Fontenrose 1978 and Rosenberger 2001; on 
riddles, Forster 1945 and Humphreys 1996. By the time of Thucydides, a change in attitude 
is discernible in his cynical view of oracles (Peloponnesian War V.103; Dover 1988: 72).
7. A full-scale analysis of the Derveni papyrus (PDerv) is now available in Betegh 2005.
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as we know, with Theagenes of Rhegium (ca. 525 BCE), Metrodorus of 
Lampsacus, and Stesimbrotus of Thasos. All three are reported to have 
used etymologies and to have offered allegorical interpretations of myths. 
Metrodorus, a pupil of the Presocratic Anaxagoras (ca. 430 BCE), claims 
the presence of a world/body analogy in Homer’s epic while “reading” 
the gods as symbols of body parts (Califf 2003). Some of these early tech-
niques are fanciful allegorical readings with attempts to see heroes as parts 
of the universe. Others are mythological with some etymology thrown in 
(Richardson 1975), while Stesimbrotus also shows an interest in symbol-
ism and apparently wrote a work entitled Exegesis of Pythagorean Symbols (fr. 
58C6 Diels-Kranz0). In the repertoire of these early “exegetes,” particu-
larly striking features are the distinction of a word’s different meanings, the 
assumption that a text has a hidden meaning (huponoia, “under-meaning”; 
Richardson 1975: 66–67), and a general concern for the plausibility of 
how the text represents the world. As we shall see, these features will pro-
mote a more coherent strategy by the early fifth century BCE, in Plato’s 
Protagoras.
 The rise of this new outlook must be sought in broad cultural devel-
opments. In the seventh and sixth centuries BCE, a new perspective on 
the world arose from the cultural ferment of the trading centers in Asia 
Minor (Miletus, Colophon, Ephesus). There, previous certainties were 
questioned, alternatives to existing customs considered, and new forms of 
discourse invented, all of which would drive philosophical analysis of the 
world and its components (Most 1999a). The natural philosophers began 
to explain the world in a way radically different from Homer’s mythical 
accounts. Refuting opponents meant offering alternative causes or material 
constituents. Fragmentary Presocratic texts show imaginative individuals 
proposing certain primary stuffs as the origin of everything (Thales: water; 
Anaximenes: air; Heraclitus: fire). Before long, a competitive spirit began 
to encourage philosophers to probe the linguistic expression of their rivals’ 
positions, thus also exploring an interpretive and argumentative route 
in trying to assess whose explanation was superior (Cherniss 1977). Such 
interaction signals the new role of polemic in the interpretation of both 
8. Richardson (1975, 1980, 1992) has usefully outlined some of the evidence we have for the 
early engagement with the Homeric poems; see also note 9.
9. The evidence for Theagenes is found in a scholion on the Iliad 20,67 = fr. 8,2 DK (Algra 
2001: 562n1); see also Yunis 2003: 193 on Plato’s Ion, in which Ion claims, remarkably, to be 
better than both Metrodorus and Stesimbrotus at interpreting Homer. Clearly these two 
were household names in Athens with regard to Homer exegesis.
10. Diels-Kranz (hereafter DK) refers to the edition of the fragments of Presocratic philoso-
phers and some contemporary intellectuals (ca. 700–400 BCE) in the 1989 reprint of the 6th 
edition in Berlin in 1952.
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the world and the word. For instance, Xenophanes famously criticized 
the Homeric gods (fragments B14–16 DK) on the good grounds that an 
anthropomorphic depiction saddled them with human features ( jealousy, 
greed, etc.) unbefitting divine beings. No doubt Xenophanes’ awareness 
of his audience and of the value of persuasive rhetoric also play their role 
here, since his polemic may aim at both refutation and persuasion.
 Among the necessary conditions for sophisticated textual analysis and 
interpretation, the most important was the gradual change from an oral 
to a more literate society (Havelock 1963, Thomas 1992). The transition 
shows most clearly in the rise of prose texts, which are an immediate result 
of writing; oral cultures prefer poetic forms, in part for their mnemonic 
value. Developments in rhetoric led to more sophisticated exegetical 
strategies, including the shaping and sharpening of the tools of exegesis: 
interest in argumentative patterns, in technical terminology, in techniques 
for structuring prose, and in grammar all developed from this cultural 
transformation. Polemic enters from the earliest philosophical testimonia 
on Parmenides and Empedocles, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Democritus. 
Text (rhêton) and subtext (dianoia/huponoia) became lexical reflexes of physi-
cal phenomena and their deeper meaning: “the appearances are a glimpse 
of the obscure” is a slogan attributed to several Presocratics, in particular 
Anaxagoras (fr. B21a DK) and Democritus (fr. B117 DK).
 Different approaches to interpretation can be identified among the 
Presocratics, ranging from more systematic explanations of earlier philoso-
phers to highly polemical refutations. Empedocles (ca. 500 BCE) is clearly 
trying to take up the challenge of Parmenides’ arguments against the pos-
sibility of motion, but he goes far beyond a polemical refutation by giving 
a comprehensive and systematic explanation of the physical world and 
its genesis. Theagenes’ allegorizing interpretation of Homer was in part a 
defense against the moralizing criticism leveled at the poet by Xenophanes 
( Janko 2002–3: 7–8). Heraclitus wanted to counter some of the misguided 
ideas of his predecessors that “knowing a lot of things” (polymathia [fr. 40 
DK]) would amount to understanding or intelligence (noos). He draws 
an interesting contrast between the amount of information ( polymathia, a 
quantitative notion) and the right kind of interpretation (noos, a qualitative 
notion). Such critical assessments clearly illustrate the competitive nature 
of philosophical debate and presuppose a shared sense of purpose: to give 
an explanatory account of the world but (unlike Hesiod or Homer) a ratio-
nal one.
 These cases show how, within 250 years of its introduction, writing 
became the vehicle of elaborate theoretical speculation, even if it came 
initially in the traditional guise of poetry (Parmenides, Empedocles, and 
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Xenophanes use Homeric hexameter). Such “cultural hybrids,” presenting 
oral thought patterns in prose or rational thought in poetry (Russo 1997), 
are the hallmark of the transitional phase of this period of Greek science 
and cosmology (Havelock 1982, Ong 1982).
 Prose writings in oral style began to win ground with Pherecydes of 
Syros (ca. 540 BCE) and Heraclitus (ca. 500 BCE). The latter, nicknamed 
the “riddler” by Timon of Phlius (Diogenes Laertius 9.6), deliberately used 
an oracular, enigmatic style (West 1971)—as in the aphoristic “the way up 
and down is one and the same” (fr. 60 DK). He thus provoked his audi-
ence to inquire further, by a pedagogical technique that would be much 
refined by Plato in his dialogues. Here the inquiry becomes a continuous 
dialogue, or rather trialogue, implicating the reader as interpreter. Inter-
pretation becomes a creative activity in the form of exegesis, which can 
take the form of rephrasing, explicating, and rejecting the views discussed. 
Clearly these early philosophical styles are part of a transitional stage and 
primarily first-order clarifications: the polemical, second-order aspect is 
reactive and negative in that it aims to counter an opponent’s view while 
merely implying that the critic was right, because the opponent had been 
“proven” wrong. To build a positive case requires a further effort (e.g., a 
cosmogony, an evolutionary story, or a teleology).
 It is in the fifth century BCE that clear evidence for a second-order 
discourse (in the sense of a text talking about another text) is found in 
philosophical circles. This is a period when different strands from rhetoric, 
religion, and philosophical discourse contribute to this new form of “com-
menting on” other people’s views as a self-conscious and self-contained 
activity: a written text was viewed as objectivized thought, lending a more 
fixed character to words and ideas which had been fluid and expressed 
in various ways when transmitted orally (Yunis 2003). To trace this new 
trend, we need only look at the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle as the clearest 
cases (see also the next section). Word games and more meticulous analy-
ses, assisted by writing, raised awareness of the processes of thought and 
argumentation, leading to linguistic stability and semantic differentiation. 
For example, terms for types of writing proliferate, and soon distinctions 
between comments (hypomnêmata) and preparatory notes (hypomnêmatikon) 
helped describe the compositional stages of interpretive works (Dorandi 
1991). In the relatively short period of one hundred years (480–380 BCE), 
11. Depending on the survival of the work, we can see that some or all of these compo-
nents are present. For a fascinating analysis of the ways in which early Greek philosophy 
was informed by existing literary modes of composition and presentation, see also Most 
(1999b: 342), who speaks of “implicit poetics of early Greek literature” and “the context of 
expectations.”
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this trend helped crystallize certain existing techniques in rhetoric (Mans-
feld 1986) and in emerging philosophical argumentation (Nehamas 1990) 
into what was to become philosophical commentary: it involved the 
methodical evaluative scrutiny of existing philosophical views with the 
purpose of pushing forward the search for the truth. Thus, polemic pro-
gressed and was absorbed into systematic dialectic. Formalization was the 
next logical step.
3. From Exegesis to Commentary
The first ancient philosophical commentary is commonly placed in the 
first century BCE/CE, but a quick review of the diverse opinions on the 
subject shows that there exists in fact little agreement on this issue. The 
discussion suffers from incomplete evidence and a lack of clarity in defi-
nition (e.g., comments on parts of works are conflated with running com-
mentary), while the incipient nature of the genre is usually ignored. But 
the crucial issue for this investigation—how various influences informed 
the evolution of philosophical interpretation at different stages—requires a 
more dynamic account to show that the strategies and tools used reflect the 
ongoing change and development of exegesis. Let us review some impor-
tant evidence.
 The fifth century BCE starts and ends with political upheaval in 
Athens. Greek cultural identity as a unifying notion owed much to the 
wars against the common Persian enemy but even more to Homer and the 
rise of influential intellectual figures who developed classical drama (Aes-
chylus, Sophocles, Euripides), rhetoric (Gorgias), cultural history, and lin-
guistics (Protagoras, Prodicus) within the newly established urban environ-
ment. From the grand cosmic themes of fate and justice to more practical 
matters of litigation, the Athenians—whether native or adopted—rapidly 
honed their argumentative skills, culminating in rhetorical masterpieces 
of the courts and the agora. Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen (ca. 414 BCE) 
is a good example of sophistic reasoning: it is an unorthodox and irrev-
12. Should we agree with John Dillon (1996 [1977]: 437), who has suggested that “it is only 
in the generation of Eudorus [first century BCE] that the tradition of formal commentary 
on both Plato and Aristotle seems to begin”? (my emphasis). His comment does not sit well 
with another, in which he states (ibid. 43): “Crantor [third century BCE] who wrote the first 
formal commentary as a Platonist on a work of Plato.” Other views are more implicit about 
the supposed inauguration of commentary as a genre, ranging from the third century BCE 
(Aristotle’s immediate successors) to the first century BCE.
13. The so-called “golden age” under Pericles (461–429 BCE) came after the wars against 
Persia (492–489, 480 BCE) and before the collapse of Athenian power in the war against 
Sparta (430–404 BCE).
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erent display of rhetorical skill, arguing that Helen was not to blame for 
choosing to go to Troy with Paris (Wardy 1996). Persuasion is a major aim 
here, and it operates through the subtle use of language, particularly of 
grammatical and argumentative structures which help to forge the tech-
nical apparatus for the second-order activity of explaining texts: we find 
metalinguistic comments on syntax and semantics, polemical strategies for 
refuting an argument (e.g., reductio ad absurdum), and shrewd, “mind-
bending” tactics.
 In spite of his strong rejection of sophistic morals and style, Plato stands 
at the crossroads of oral and literate forms of expression. Seen within this 
broader intellectual context, his dialogues appear at a time when certain 
exegetical tactics were already well established, but they do not yet belong 
to a self-conscious, scholarly enterprise with formal rules. As Glen Most 
(2005: 169) aptly describes the process, “Commentators have always theo-
rized . . . but for thousands of years this theorization tended to take the form 
of tacit knowledge, oral report, and personal anecdote.” Plato’s awareness 
of the growing use of writing (e.g., Phaedrus 274b–276a; see Havelock 1963), 
his suspicions of its effects on traditional approaches to poetry and edu-
cation, and his reservations about the philosophical use of writing are the 
clearest indications of how the new age of literacy started to influence the 
intellectual circles of Athens. But Plato is mostly concerned with philosophi-
cal debate, and the use of writing was still rather restricted, slowly (but 
never fully) replacing traditional oral modes of expressing thought. By 
giving pride of place to oral teaching, Plato is in fact fighting a rearguard 
battle against the advance of the use of writing, which could no longer be 
stopped.
 The discussion of a poem by Simonides in Plato’s Protagoras 339a–348c 
is a prime example of emerging commentary, as it incorporates exegetical 
tools found in the Homerists and the Sophists. The idea that in this dia-
logue we can glimpse a developed stage of formal exegesis is not entirely 
new, but comments to that effect are mostly limited to passing remarks. 
14. For a lucid discussion of the influence of rhetoric on hermeneutics in the Roman period, 
see Eden 1997: chaps. 1–2. On the psychagogic powers of Gorgias, the classic treatment is 
Segal 1962.
15. Some see signs of transition already among the Presocratics (e.g., Havelock 1982 [1966]; 
Robb 1983). For some important critical notes on the Presocratic role in the growth of lit-
eracy, see Ferrari 1984.
16. By bringing in the oral/written opposition, I have given one reason for taking Plato as 
an example and a starting point for the rise of formal commentary. A further reason is that 
he describes the interpretative process in detail, reflecting on topic, method, and the claims 
made by the interpreter.
17. See, e.g., Richardson 1975, Scodel 1986, Carson 1992, Eden 1997, Hussey 1999. This 
paragraph summarizes Baltussen 2004.
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The Simonides episode is one of several in which we see Plato adopting 
and discussing the practice of clarifying a text in a way that must have had 
a well-established role in the education of wealthy Athenians: when Socra-
tes offers to show Protagoras his ability at “interpreting” poetry (Protagoras 
342a1–2), he picks up on an earlier remark from Protagoras that reading 
poetry is a true gentleman’s activity (339a). Socrates claims to know the 
author’s intention (boulêsis), uses grammatical arguments to prove points, 
and proposes different ways of illustrating the hidden meaning (dianoia; 
341c8, 347a4) of the poem, such as postulating an unusual meaning for a 
word (341b1–2). Moreover, the interpretation also includes two prototypes 
of hermeneutical principles concerning the importance of consistency 
(341e1–2, what became known as the “Homer from Homer” principle 
in later times) and the assumption that one can attribute an overall pur-
pose to a poem rather than simply interpret single words or phrases. But 
Socrates abruptly turns away from this activity, saying it is not what they 
should be doing if and when they want to engage in testing truth and their 
own ideas instead of those of others (347c–348a). Thus, the seeds of the 
commentary tradition were already sown in the pre-Platonic literary tradi-
tion, and the Protagoras passage can be used as a window on the past, as a 
display of sophistic methods based on an earlier tradition. Even if we allow 
for an element of parody in Plato’s representation of these practices, it had 
to contain realistic features to be plausible and credible for his audience.0
 With the possible exception of the Derveni papyrus (see section 2), 
the first clear evidence for a philosophical work commenting extensively 
on another text is post-Platonic. Crantor, a pupil of Plato in the early 
Academy (ca. 350 BCE), is usually mentioned as the “first commentator” 
on Plato’s cosmological account the Timaeus (Proclus, On the Timaeus I, 
p. 76, 2.277,8; Diehl 1903–6). The label exêgêtês, previously used of religious 
interpreters, is here applied to a natural philosopher. Given the late date of 
our source (Proclus lived ca. 410–485 CE), the use of exêgêtês requires cau-
tion: to translate it as “commentator” might be misleading. Crantor prob-
ably wrote only short comments on selected passages (not a full running 
18. See also Ford 1994, which offers a persuasive argument for Plato’s awareness of the spe-
cial requirements for interpreting fragmentary texts.
19. The seminal paper on the Homerum ex Homero principle is Schäublin 1977; cf. recent 
observations in Mansfeld 1994, Sluiter 2000, Baltussen 2004. See also section 4.2 of this 
essay.
20. See a more elaborate argument for this in Baltussen 2004; cf. Yunis 2003, Kahn 2003.
21. The contrast drawn here between religious and philosophical discourse should not be 
taken as a strict opposition. I merely want to highlight the dominant factor which sets the 
Derveni papyrus apart from the Anon. In what follows, it will become clear that the religious 
aspect never ceases to play a role.
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commentary), and given Proclus’s tendency to merge the religious and 
the philosophical, the term may have a double reference, with a reminder 
of its original use.
 Polemics continued to play a significant role in philosophy after Plato. 
Of course, polemic and refutation are often biased forms of interpretation, 
but they will nonetheless be based on an interpretive act (or the presump-
tion of such an act), going some way toward sharpening the mind and 
method of those who engage in it. Therefore, these different early forays 
into exegesis, no matter how embryonic in character, led to a consider-
able rise in works with an interpretive objective directed at refutation and 
response. The Protagoras passage thus shows that polemic and exegesis con-
tributed to the development of a more sophisticated methodology in the 
interpretation of texts.
 As a result, philosophy also became a scholarly enterprise in the fourth 
century BCE. Aristotle wrote a work entitled Homeric Problems while also 
composing responses to or comments on individual thinkers and schools 
(e.g., Diogenes Laertius [= D.L.] 5.88 Response to Democritus’s Exegeses, 
1 book). His colleague and successor Theophrastus probably wrote exten-
sive polemical notes assembled in a collection of Objections (D.L. 5.43–
49). In Plato’s Academy, Arcesilaus had a reputation as a scholarly man 
(D.L. 4.30 “lover of letters,” philogrammatos), while Crantor is said to have 
composed “notebooks” (hypomnêmata [D.L. 3.24]). Epicureans are also 
mentioned as involved in the learned activity of writing critical works or 
summaries of the ideas of others. The Stoics were known to interpret 
22. See Runia 1986: 47, 53. Historical and literary output at the time supports the claim 
that full-blown running commentaries do not yet exist: “commentary on the Royal Diary 
of Alexander” [ca. 335 BCE] (Hammond 1987); “the first attested commentary on a text, 
Aristophanes’ Plutus, [was] by Eratosthenes’ pupil Euphormius” [ca. third through second 
centuries BCE] (Wilson 1969: 370, ignoring the Derveni papyrus, published in rudimen-
tary form in 1967); “the first commentary on a prose author: Aristarchus’s commentary on 
Herodotus” [second century BCE] (ibid.: 371). Cf. note 31.
23. Possibly an etymologizing comment. For Proclus’s fusing of religion and philosophy, see 
especially van den Berg 2001.
24. There were no rules of fair play in debate (Long 1992: 50). The seminal article on 
polemic in this context is Owen 1983; see also Baltussen 2003.
25. Confirmed by another passage of the Platonic commentator Taurus, quoted in Philopo-
nus, Against Proclus vi 8 (145.20–4 Rabe 1963 [1899]) = Theophrastus fr. 241c FHSG. Theo-
phrastus’s On Sense Perception also illustrates the point (Baltussen 2000).
26. Epicurus is said to be “highly educated (philographôtatos) and surpassing all in the quan-
tity of books” and “summary of the books against the natural philosophers” (D.L. X.26). In 
an exegetical treatise preserved on a papyrus from Herculaneum (PHerc. 1012), Demetrius 
of Laconia, a well-known Epicurean (ca. 100 BCE), discussed difficult passages (cruces) in 
important works by Epicurus (Sedley 1998: 70).
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poetry by Hesiod (Algra 2001), Homer (Long 1992), and many others. 
Zeno wrote refutations (elenchoi [D.L. 7.4]) and Kleanthes explanations of 
Heraclitus (Exegeses of Heraclitus, 4 books [D.L. 7.174]). Beyond these titles, 
the evidence is fragmentary and limited, yet they are a clear indication of 
the lively activity of interpreting the views of others in the fourth century 
BCE.
 A more advanced stage can be seen in Peripatetic discussions of their 
philosophical predecessors. Aristotle’s approach in preliminary passages of 
his Metaphysics A, On the Soul A, and Physics A, criticizing anterior views on 
the subject, seems to represent early attempts at interpreting the ideas of 
others within the systematic context of his own argument. His immedi-
ate successors (after 322 BCE) were left with the task of keeping a school 
going that needed to cover an unprecedented range of research activities 
and build on a wide body of knowledge. Consolidation was only one of 
the strategies, and the individual responses to the work of the school’s 
founder included critical corrections as well as expansive supplementation 
(Fazzo 2004). Theophrastus’s discussion of the Presocratics and Plato in 
his On Sense Perception also involves textual exegesis with clear signs that 
he dealt with a written original (Baltussen 2000). By now, the discussion 
of the intended meanings of his master’s works and the need for subtle 
corrective maneuvres, however, signal a new problem: would challenging 
the corpus threaten its authority—and thus impede its canonization? As in 
Plato’s Academy, subsequent generations had to consider the unity of the 
founder’s thought. This created a tension between philosophical creativity 
and the notion of authority.
 So, some three centuries after the first written version of Homer’s epics 
and 150 years after the first major allegorical readings of these epics, phi-
losophy is seen to enter the arena of textual interpretation, with written texts 
as a basis for study and clarification. Fusing literary with philosophical 
methods, Plato and Aristotle offer critical discussions of increasing subtlety 
and sophistication, appropriating what they considered useful and reject-
ing what they considered misguided or wrong. The tradition was being 
constructed in the light of their own achievements, casting their prede-
cessors in the role of “mumbling precursors” to their own well-formulated 
ideas (Aristotle Metaphysics A.7, 988a22–24; 993a15). One generation later, 
27. Cf. D.L. 7.178 on Sphaerus and D.L. 7.187 on Chrysippus.
28. See Baltussen 2000 with further references. For Aristotle’s influence on Alexandrian 
scholarship (traceable from his Poetics and Homeric Problems), see Richardson 1993.
29. Continuation of the school was not certain: “Aristotle died in Chalcis . . . his school was 
in abeyance and his will gives no hint that he expected it to survive” (Gottschalk 2002: 26).
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the Stoics pushed the appropriation of past achievements even further: for 
instance, when they try to make the Presocratic Heraclitus (ca. 500 BCE) 
“fit the mold” of Stoic natural philosophy or when they declare Homer 
himself to be an allegorist (Long 1992). Such a method of fitting a square 
peg into a round hole—from now on a standard (though not always con-
sciously applied) trick of the trade—resulted from the attempt to construe a 
worldview which could be regarded as a continuation of traditional Greek 
theological concepts. Even Homer exegesis would continue to play a part 
in the exegetical tradition up to the late Platonist commentators (Lamber-
ton and Keaney 1992).
 Clearly, then, there was considerable exegetical activity long before 
the anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus (referred to also as Anon.) 
appeared.0 Only a developmental account can use evidence from the fully 
developed form of commentary to infer anything about the character of 
earlier examples. No doubt Anon. is our first extant example of a formal 
commentary in the tradition of Plato’s Academy (but see note 31), which 
lasted with some interruptions into the sixth century CE. This commen-
tary uses basic techniques of clarifying words and phrases (with short tags 
as lemmata). From the surviving material, it can be inferred that it also 
aims at a comprehensive interpretation of the dialogue (skopos), includ-
ing the prologues as symbolic representations of the characters. In other 
words, the work presents a continuation of the Platonic style of exegesis 
that we saw in statu nascendi in the Protagoras, itself evidence of both estab-
lished practices and innovative moves.
 In addition, a new dynamic arises with Anon. While the early instances 
of exegesis were either compositional (Homeric bards), oppositional (Pre-
socratic polemic), or selective (Crantor), the anonymous Commentary on 
Plato’s Theaetetus is the earliest extant case of a “running commentary” 
defending the Platonic position: a case of apologetics, mounted by a “con-
vert,” as it happens. Additional elements in the exegesis, however, also show 
the commentator to be a product of his time: his syncretism is evident in 
the Stoic and Peripatetic notions that merge with the Platonist perspective 
(Sedley 1997). He assumes a variety of outlooks, some of which may exert 
a subconscious influence on his style or his thought, because they were in 
circulation as the coin of contemporary philosophical currency. Yet in spite 
of its syncretism, the intention of this commentary (regardless of whether 
30. Although the date for this work is disputed, it is generally assumed to be from the first 
century BCE or CE. A modern edition of the papyrus is in Bastianini and Sedley 1995. Its 
importance for the early history of philosophical exegesis has been emphasized by Tarrant 
1993 and Sedley 1997.
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we judge it to be successful) is to offer a genuine Platonist interpretation. 
By now, the central text had gained so much authority that it could no 
longer be challenged—at least, not openly. The philosophical canon had 
arrived.
4. Running Commentary: 100–700 CE
4.1. Aristotelians and Platonists in Late Antiquity
After the anonymous Commentary, the first clear examples of the running 
commentary occur in the first and second centuries CE, such as those writ-
ten by the Aristotelians Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias (Hadot 
2002a: 184) and by the Platonist Galen. Platonism would be dominant 
for the next four hundred years. Starting with Plotinus (ca. 210–275 CE), 
a new curriculum for would-be Platonists was designed and then devel-
oped further by Plotinus’s pupil and biographer Porphyry, marking a new 
stage in the history of Greek philosophy (Sorabji 1990: 5–10). Again we 
find ourselves in an educational context, where direct teacher/pupil inter-
action remained crucial, but with a surprising twist: instead of upholding 
a sharp contrast between Plato and Aristotle, the Platonists started using 
Aristotle’s work as the introduction to Plato’s thought, and commentary on 
both authors became the preferred mode of education. As Richard Sorabji 
(ibid.: 5) puts it, “Not for the only time in the history of philosophy . . . 
a perfectly crazy position (harmony) proved philosophically fruitful. To 
establish the harmony of Plato and Aristotle, philosophers had to think 
up new ideas and the result was an amalgam different from either of the 
two original philosophies.” Lloyd Gerson (2005: 270) clarifies why this was 
possible: “Platonists, for the most part, did not regard Aristotle as an anti-
Platonist.” A new Platonism was born.
 Despite a revived interest in Neoplatonism during the Renaissance, 
proper appreciation of this school of thought did not come until the twen-
tieth century. The first and only modern edition of the Platonist commen-
31. Earlier Platonists obviously commented on his ideas (Dillon 1996 [1977], Tarrant 2000), 
but the earliest successors (Speusippus, Xenocrates) are still engaged in establishing the 
authoritative Platonic text, or in other words, what it is that might become the canon. According 
to Obbink (2003: 179), the earliest extant “commentary” on Plato is that on the Phaedo from 
the third century BCE. Plato’s and Plotinus’s works are the only ones to survive complete.
32. Gerson (ibid.: 271) also rightly emphasizes that “to be in harmony” “must be sharply 
distinguished from the view, held by no one in antiquity, that the philosophy of Aristotle was 
identical with the philosophy of Plato.”
33. The translations and discussions of Marsilio Ficino (1433–99) did much to bring 
(Neo)platonism to the attention of the West and to counterbalance the dominance of Aristo-
telianism (see Schmitt et al. 1988).
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taries on Aristotle was published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries under the general editorship of Hermann Diels on behalf of the 
Berlin Academy of Sciences. Diels’s realization that some of these long 
works could actually be useful for other areas (Presocratic philosophy in 
particular) contributed to the production of some twenty-five fat volumes 
(about fifteen thousand pages) between 1887 and 1910. The edition includes 
commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics, Metaphysics, and Ethics by the Aristo-
telian Alexander of Aphrodisias (ca. 200 CE) and by the Platonists Simpli-
cius (ca. 530 CE), Philoponus (ca. 530 CE), Olympiodorus (ca. 650 CE), 
and others. But Diels’s objective to mine these texts for precious fragments 
(a kind of antiquarianism which has gone out of fashion) already betrays 
his skewed interest in this corpus.
 The edition’s title emphatically announces the works as Greek commen-
taries on Aristotle (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca). This label contrib-
uted further to the identification and (we might say now) stigmatization 
of these works as derivative in form and a confused type of Platonism in 
doctrine. The latter judgment, based on commentaries from the fifth and 
sixth centuries CE, had been labeled “Neuplatonismus” (Neoplatonism) 
by the eighteenth-century encylopedists, who were anxious to pigeonhole 
these works. Of course, anything receiving the prefix “neo” is presumed 
to be of lesser value than whatever it is qualifying. Accordingly, these 
works were seen as secondary at best, while more severe assessments would 
regard them as parasitic. Such a view presumes a heavy-handed preference 
for the classical (Plato being “contaminated” by, or drowned in, syncretis-
tic scholasticism) and places a rather modern, but misguided, emphasis 
on originality as the single most important criterion for philosophical dis-
course. This post-Romantic and one-sided view of the late Platonists has 
come under attack more recently; there are sufficient reasons to consider 
the late commentaries as distinct, creative, and sometimes even original 
pieces of writing (Sorabji 1987, 1990).
 In this section of the essay, two elements of this renewed study of late 
commentaries will be highlighted: the scientific (medical) commentary 
(section 4.2) and the late Platonist commentaries on Aristotle (section 4.3). 
Both types deserve more elaborate treatment, but my aim here is to assess 
briefly how the didactic motive behind them may have helped or hindered 
their exegetical mission.
34. See Hager 1983 on the origin and meaning of the term.
35. This seemingly radical shift has had to overcome ingrained views on the importance 
of the “classical” period. Renewed interest in Hellenistic philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s 
helped to break the dominant fascination with the classical period in modern scholarship.
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4.2. Scientific Commentary: Galen
The importance of the philosopher-doctor Galen (129–219 CE) in the 
development of commentary has long been underrated. Recent apprecia-
tion of his methodology and style has come with the reediting of his works 
and the renewed interest in ancient science and medicine. Galen adds a 
further dimension to commentary, because his work is shaped by his sci-
entific outlook, his intelligence, and his keen sense of self-promotion (von 
Staden 1997). A Platonist in his broader outlook, he also adhered to Aris-
totelian science (as he understood it) with an emphasis on language, logic, 
and methodological rigor. But his focus was medicine and Hippocrates his 
hero. His commentaries on the Hippocratic Corpus (eighteen attested) are 
of immense value for studying the philological and exegetical development 
of the genre (Mansfeld 1994; Sluiter 1995; von Staden 2002).
 His contributions fall under two headings: (a) as a scientific author, 
his methodology is characterized by respect for both logic and empirical 
evidence; (b) as an author living in the second century CE, he is heavily 
influenced by the so-called Second Sophistic, when a revival of classical 
Greek culture occurred. His presentation of arguments is thus scientifi-
cally thorough and rhetorically sophisticated, but as has been shown more 
recently, his public demonstrations of anatomical experiments also play a 
significant role (von Staden 1997).
 For our purposes, it is important to understand his strategy in inter-
preting Hippocratic medicine. What are his presuppositions? What kind of 
issues does he consider important? How does he construct solutions to exe-
getical problems? Are there any patterns in his problem-solving method? 
Galen imposed upon himself a set of values which were to cause quite a few 
problems for his interpretive approach. For one thing, as a card-carrying 
Hippocratic, he would insist that Hippocrates was almost always right. 
Obviously, such a position would force him to make some unusual exegeti-
cal moves—for instance, to explain inconsistencies between the heteroge-
36. The standard edition of Kühn (1821–33) is slowly being replaced by modern editions, 
including CMG = Corpus Medicorum Graecorum (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag), but often we must 
still rely on Kühn.
37. The neglect of Galen is part of a broader trend: standard overviews of ancient scholar-
ship (e.g., Pfeiffer 1978 [1968]) often focus on the literary evidence and tend to neglect philo-
sophical and scientific writing. The pioneering article by Johannes Geffcken, “Zur Entste-
hung und zum Wesen des Griechischen Wissenschaftlichen Kommentars” (1932), has never 
received the follow-up for which its author may have hoped. Work is now underway to 
redress that imbalance.
38. The most informed analyses of Galen’s method are found in von Staden 1995, 1997, 
2002 (which I follow here) and Hankinson 1991, 1998. On the Second Sophistic see Anderson 
1993, Whitmarsh 2005.
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neous works of the Hippocratic corpus or to clarify problematic passages. 
Galen may be trying to deal with such sources of “embarrassment” when 
he is seen to explain away textual problems in different ways (Sluiter 1995). 
He seems too dogmatic in his defense of Hippocrates, but again it shows 
how the canonization of an author lies at the heart of a commentator’s 
motivation. In addition, his allegiance to both Plato and Aristotle only 
creates further difficulties on issues where these authors disagree (Barnes 
1992; Baltussen forthcoming a). His eclectic education led him to take a 
syncretistic approach, but with it came the need to iron out clashes arising 
from three distinct systems of thought.
 Galen’s views on exegesis may have been shaped by discipline-specific 
examples, such as his teacher Pelops, who wrote private commentaries on 
Hippocrates. But he was also aware of broader principles of exegesis due 
to his familiarity with the “classics” and their reception. Clarity and clari-
fication are his prime concern (On Hippocrates’ On Fractures xviiiB, 318–19; 
Kühn: 1821–33):
Before I begin the detailed interpretation, it is worth saying in general about any 
interpretation that its purpose is to render clear what is unclear in the text itself. To 
prove that what is written in the text is true, or to refute it as false, or to defend 
it against captious criticisms—these are no part of interpretation, although they 
are customarily done by pretty well everyone who writes commentaries. There 
is indeed no reason why an interpreter should not touch lightly on these matters; 
but a thorough examination of the author’s doctrines falls outside the boundary 
of interpretation. (Translated in Barnes 1992: 271; my emphases)
Such a strict division of labor was absent in earlier periods, and Galen seems 
to state a minority view. To us, the separation of “a thorough examination 
of the author’s doctrines” and “interpretation” seems contradictory, until 
we note that it is a matter of degree (“lightly” vs. “thorough”), depending, 
as Galen sees it, on the particular aim of one’s activity. Galen also makes a 
distinction between intentional misrepresentation of a text (katapseudomenos) 
and accidental mistakes through ignorance (agnoia).0 It is clear that here 
we have reached a higher level of sophistication, in which a deeper aware-
ness of the requirements and characteristics of the commentator’s activity 
feeds into the execution of the task. The self-monitoring stance about how 
to proceed, and why, illustrates that exegesis had advanced considerably as 
a genre which is aware of its own past.
39. See Smith 1996 [1978]: 70, and note, for references. Smith (ibid.: n65) also notes that, as 
an exercise, Galen reduced twenty anatomical commentaries of Marinus (another teacher) 
to four books!
40. Galen’s On Hippocrates’ On the Nature of Man 1.2.25 Kühn (modern ed. CMG vol. 5.9.1 
p. 15.13–25) = Theophrastus fr. 231 FHSG.
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 Galen’s actual procedure has been lucidly clarified recently by Heinrich 
von Staden (2002), who distinguishes at least four exegetical moves:
 1. semantic clarification (ibid.: 112)
 2. “expansive inflationary retelling” (ibid.)
 3. paraphrasing “Hippocrates” by “Hippocrates” (ibid.: 115)
 4. refuting rival interpretations (ibid.: 117).
By themselves, these strategies seem to be reasonable means to the clarifi-
cation of a text, though a few cautionary comments are in order. Move (1) 
will make use of parallels, even from different genres, to elucidate word 
meanings, in the belief that the ordinary usage of language can also be 
found in poets. Move (2) is an important development which will become 
the mainstay of commentary: expansive retelling is a form of paraphrase 
which allows for unpacking (exhaplôsis), “repackaging,” and clarifying in dif-
ferent ways. In addition, Hippocrates’ prose is terse and aphoristic. As von 
Staden (ibid.: 113) rightly stresses, Galen can thus “move from philological 
interpretation to doctrinal explication,” sometimes breaking his own rules. 
Move (3) is the equivalent of the “Homer from Homer” principle (cf. note 
19) and may include “transformative paraphrase” with elisions (ibid.: 116), 
exposing certain biases and specific interests of the commentator. And 
move (4) clearly shows that polemic has not lost in importance, not only 
because medicine was a highly competitive profession but also because 
Galen was convinced that his predecessors did not live up to his standards 
in their explication of Hippocrates. Thus, Galen strove for “the recupera-
tive elucidation of the obscure ancient voice” (ibid.: 114) by attempting 
to design a rigorous and refined methodology of exegesis. He raised the 
stakes, absorbing existing strategies and extending them.
 One final aspect of Galen’s method, also brought out by von Staden, 
needs to be mentioned. Galen has a very broad conception of his activity 
(much like the anonymous Commentary), which arises from his context and 
shows in his approach. Von Staden (ibid.: 118, n32) calls this the author’s 
“larger commitments” or “plot” to describe the intention to provide more 
than just “a sequence of lemmata and comments.” This makes the ancient 
philosophical (and medical) commentary fundamentally different from 
the modern commentary, which tends to become “molecularized” (ibid.: 
121 and 127). Ancient scientific commentaries were written by practicing 
41. I should note that von Staden (ibid.: 111) qualifies the term “parallels” as one of con-
venience, “under which scholars tend to cluster together quite heterogeneous relations of 
resemblance.”
42. Cf. “atomized” in Gibson 2002: 354 and “morselization” in McCarty 2002: 364. A fur-
ther supporting argument is the assumption by many ancient commentators that readers 
266 Poetics Today 28:2
scientists and physicians (ibid.: 127): commentary for the sake of commen-
tary was hardly ever an option. I would submit that this holds for the whole 
tradition as I have been presenting it, in particular the late Platonist com-
mentators from Plotinus onward.
4.3. (Neo)Platonism
Many of the emerging reflexes and recurrent themes I have described so 
far persist in the commentaries of the late Platonists. The idea of “tradi-
tion,” of placing oneself in a line of interpreters, bestows both authority 
and continuity upon one’s activity. Within the teaching context of the Pla-
tonic school, however, a more formalized methodology had been estab-
lished, and with it came an increasing complexity in the levels of commen-
tary: we should think of the tradition as a complex texture or fabric rather 
than just accumulated layers (as with Russian dolls). This means we always 
encounter a complex document, which cannot be read simply as a guide 
to Aristotle.
 The standard topics that crystallized in the later tradition have been 
studied extensively in recent years. But there we of course have to do 
with a well-documented interpretive tradition, which, starting from the 
first century CE, builds on and reacts to its predecessors as an act of self-
proclaimed identity. This allowed for the steady growth and refinement of 
a set of standard topics which counted as a firm basis for evaluating Aris-
totle’s works. The Neoplatonic commentators came to express these as a 
fixed set of standard questions for opening the discussion of a text (Mans-
feld 1994). Such preliminary questions (e.g., concerning authorship, aim, 
theme, etc. [see note 54]) would structure the reading of these texts and 
bear on important issues of authenticity and purpose, which would lay the 
ground for detailed page-by-page, sometimes line-by-line, commentary. 
Such an approach, rooted in generations of discussion, required a schol-
arly environment and the habitual use of books. It also reflects the focus 
on a body of writings regarded as a fixed authoritative body of knowledge 
used in teaching, that is, a canon.
 It was Syrianus, the Athenian teacher of Proclus (d. 485 CE), who deter-
mined much of the commentary style in the fifth and sixth centuries CE 
(D’Ancona 2002: 208–11). He adopted Alexander’s method of providing 
will not pillage the work selectively (“hit-and-run” approach) but read it from start to finish 
(von Staden 2002: 129, on Hipparchus’s commentary to Aratus’s Phaenomena).
43. “Evidently, the theological motive of the Neoplatonic curriculum and the pressure to 
harmonize Plato with Aristotle creates dangers, if the commentaries are read as straightfor-
ward guides to Aristotle, without due allowance being made” (Sorabji 1990: 15).
44. E.g., Hadot 1987, 2002b: 167–76; Mansfeld 1994; Blumenthal 1996; Barnes 1997.
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a lêmma (literally, a “snatch” of text) for commenting, and this format 
became the norm, in preference to several other forms of presentation. 
Interestingly, as in earlier periods, the text commented upon is said to use 
“intentional unclarity”: while Orpheus and the poets were said to provide 
messages in riddles, Aristotle is now said to be deliberately unclear so as to 
fend off the uninitiated (Ammonius On Aristotle’s “Categories” 7.10–11; Busse 
1895). This argument for the self-legitimization of the commentator’s task 
(Sluiter 2000) could only lead to expansive supplementation as the main 
tool for clarification. My next and final case study, Simplicius, illustrates 
this feature well.
4.3.1. Simplicius of Cilicia: A Case Study In writing his long commentaries, 
Simplicius (ca. 530 CE) follows the tradition established by Plotinus, the 
founder of a new exegetical style which also produced a new philosophy 
we now call “Neoplatonism.” Note, however, that his followers referred 
to themselves as Platonists (not Neoplatonists, cf. note 34). In line with 
Plotinus’s practice, they came to clarify Aristotle as a prelude to the works 
of Plato, the real focus of their interest. Simplicius’s works serve to illus-
trate the late commentary style for several reasons: (a) his commentaries 
are instructive about the exegetical and didactic practices of the Neopla-
tonic school, (b) they are highly informative on centuries of Greek phi-
losophy from the Presocratics to his own day, (c) they provide insight into 
the transition from late antiquity to the Middle Ages, and (d) they show us 
a particular stage in the interpretation of Aristotle and Plato. Plotinus is 
described by his followers as a particularly inspired and inspiring teacher 
who interprets Aristotle and Plato by means of previous interpreters, Alex-
ander of Aphrodisias among them (Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, sec. 14).
 Simplicius’s scholarly method is thus remarkable and in some ways 
almost “modern.” He is unusually self-conscious of his approach and 
thoughtful in his assessment of the text, of manuscripts, and of an astound-
ing range of sources (cf. Chase 2003: 8 and below). These scholarly quali-
ties he combines with more practical talents. Since Iamblichus (third cen-
tury CE), a greater emphasis on religion had resurfaced in philosophy (cf. 
note 43). It could range from a ritualistic approach (which Proclus calls 
“theurgy”) to theological discussions about theodicy and the creation of 
the world (Simplicius, Philoponus).
45. For instance, lecture notes (“from the master’s voice,” apo phônês), or discussion divided 
into theôria and praxis (Olympiodorus, ca. 650 CE), or interpretive paraphrase (Themistius, 
ca. 317–387 CE).
46. As was most recently pointed out by Chase 2003: 8. But this has been a growing consen-
sus for some years now; cf. Hadot 1987; Tarán 1987: 246–47 (which mentions two of the four 
points listed below); de Haas 2001; Baltussen 2002a, forthcoming b.
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 The lofty abstractness of the philosophy and interpretation in these works 
should not mislead us into thinking that Platonism was just an intellectual 
movement: views were held with strong conviction, and the learning pro-
cess resembled a religious initiation. In the curriculum, Aristotle’s works 
were treated as the “smaller mysteries” in opposition to Plato’s “Greater 
Mysteries.” Not surprisingly, there are significant parallels with Chris-
tian exegetical strategies (Mansfeld 1994), which is at least in part a sign of 
their common Greek origin. But the rivalry between Christian and pagan 
positions is even more significant, for both parties strove to win the hearts 
and minds of men by arguing in books about books, with authoritative texts 
at the core of their enterprise. During the fourth and fifth centuries, Chris-
tianity—the official state religion, supported by real worldly authority—
threatened the pagan schools and ultimately led to the closing of Plato’s 
Academy in Athens in 529 CE.
4.3.2. Simplicius’s Use of Alexander of Aphrodisias Simplicius is a prime 
example of the full-blown commentary style. In his commentary on Aris-
totle’s Categories (7.23–32; Kalbfleisch 1907), Simplicius gives a clear idea 
of his intentions and aims as a commentator, notably acknowledging debts 
to earlier exegetes. He also develops a topos of modesty (Barnes 1992: 273), 
saying that he merely wants to expound Iamblichus’s commentary:
The worthy exegete of Aristotle’s writings must not fall wholly short of the 
latter’s greatness of intellect (megalonoia). He must also have experience of 
everything the Philosopher has written, and must be a connoisseur (epistêmôn) 
of Aristotle’s stylistic habits. His judgement must be impartial (adekaston), so 
that he may neither, out of misplaced zeal, seek to prove something well said to 
be unsatisfactory, nor, if some point should require attention, should he obsti-
nately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is always and everywhere 
infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher’s school. [The good 
exegete] must, I believe, not convict the philosophers of discordance by looking 
only at the letter (lexis) of what [Aristotle] says against Plato; but he must look 
towards the spirit (nous), and track down the harmony (sumphônia) which reigns 
between them on the majority of points. (Translated in Chase 2003: 23)
This description of the natural and acquired talents of an exegete (the 
former also found in Anon. to Theaetetus columns IX–X, Plato Republic V, 
and Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 6.1; 8; 12–13) is still sound today: impar-
tiality (a change from Galen), a broad familiarity with the works and their 
47. Mysteries (from the Greek mustês, “initiate”) point to the esoteric nature of the process of 
becoming a Platonist: Aristotle’s basic discussion of the components of the world in his Cate- 
gories was taken as the best introduction to philosophical thought leading up to the grander 
visions of Plato’s metaphysical ideas as read by Plotinus (see Wallis 1972).
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style, and remarkably, a capacity to distinguish between the letter and the 
spirit of the text. But virtue and hard work are also relevant as well as an 
interest in learning by frequent and in-depth study of Aristotle’s key con-
cepts. Simplicius not only lives up to these criteria but sometimes exceeds 
them.
 His use of his sources further illustrates his skill and innovation in clari-
fying Aristotle. The weaving of many different voices into the fabric of his 
commentaries may be compared to the writing of a symphony—an image 
Simplicius would have liked, since one of his aims is to show that there 
exists considerable agreement (symphônia) between Plato and Aristotle. To 
support his argument, he variously uses paraphrase and quotation; about 
these two devices he even expresses specific views (atypical for the Neo-
platonic school), namely, that accurate citation can be more useful than 
paraphrase (Baltussen 2002a).
 Especially remarkable is his use of one particular author, Alexander 
of Aphrodisias (chair of Aristotelian philosophy in Athens, ca. 200 CE). 
Among his many references to his preceding commentators, Simplicius 
mentions Alexander some seven hundred times. This makes him by far 
the most-quoted source in Simplicius. Alexander was known in antiquity 
as “the commentator.” His surviving works show him to be a patient and 
meticulous thinker and commentator, firmly working within the Aristote-
lian tradition without agreeing unconditionally with everything Aristotle 
wrote.0
 In the references to Alexander in the Physics commentary, however, we 
immediately face an apparent exception to the rule that Simplicius always 
used good scholarly methods. He does not introduce Alexander properly 
(by name and place of birth, as with many others, like Xenophanes of 
Colophon; 7.3–4: Anaxagoras of Klazomenai). Nor does he name him 
in a list of his sources, as he does in the context of outlining the task of a 
commentator ( just before the passage quoted above). Alexander, known as 
48. This number can only be approximate because it is based on a search on the Thesaurus 
Linguae Graecae CD-ROM (version D, © University of Irvine California) for “Alexand(r)-” 
and therefore only gives explicit occurrences of the name (and all its cases).
49. See, e.g., Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 80.15–16 and 707.33–34, “most 
knowledgeable of Aristotle’s exegetes.”
50. On certain issues, such as on the mortality of the soul, he diverged from Aristotelian 
orthodoxy (Moraux 1942; Sharples 1987). But for our purposes, it is more important to hold 
onto his general outlook in his exegetical activities as that of an Aristotelian.
51. On Aristotle’s Physics 7.1 Diels 1882. These are incidental references to Presocratics 
and obviously not exegetical commentaries; on pp. 22–28 (Diels) a significant increase 
of patronymics occurs, a feature now thought to originate in his source for this section, 
Theophrastus.
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the Commentator and the most-quoted author in Simplicius’s works by far, 
gets no special mention or introduction at all. The first occurrence of his 
name is a simple “Alexander” (2.5; Diels 1882), and it is not until the eigh-
teenth occurrence that a further label, relating to the place of provenance, 
is found (“of Aphrodisias,” 19.5; Diels 1882).
 What are we to make of this? Some have suggested that the Categories 
commentary is the most accomplished and complete one. As the starting 
point of all teaching in the (Neo)Platonic school, the authors would have 
spent the most time on it—hence the elaborate introduction, the meth-
odological refinement in both stating and executing the overall strategy. 
By contrast, the Physics commentary would represent a later stage in the 
curriculum. Because its intended place would be after the Categories, Sim-
plicius may not have felt the need for special introductions, or he may not 
have managed to finalize it. At any rate, given Alexander’s prominence 
as an exegete, it does seem odd that Alexander does not get official “credit” 
for his role in the commentary; I therefore take this absence as a sign of 
Simplicius’s tacit assumption that Alexander’s role here needs no further 
justification. Note that it is because of the syncretistic strategy of the Pla-
tonists that Simplicius can incorporate the views of the Aristotelian Alexan-
der at all. At the same time, since Alexander belongs to his own tradition 
(Aristotelianism), the act of incorporating him is bound to create tensions 
(as it did with Galen), and it is here that even Simplicius will admit to dis-
agreement with his illustrious guide—the extent of which has not yet been 
studied properly.
 The passages mentioning Alexander offer a clear opportunity to explore 
this issue, because their high number constitutes a statistically significant 
body of evidence; moreover, the majority of them represent direct quota-
tions. As the use of Alexander’s works varies, we can distinguish among the 
following four functions that his work serves in Simplicius (each illustrated 
by one or two representative examples).
52. See Hadot 1987, Mansfeld 1994.
53. Aristotle had already indicated the sequence in which to conduct the study of nature in 
his Meteorology A.1 (see Hadot 1987, Algra 1995).
54. The latter option seems unlikely simply because in every other way the introductory 
pages reflect standard topics of preliminary discussion, such as aim (skopos, 1.1 and 3.13ff.), 
title (epigraphê, 4.8–16), usefulness (khrêsimos, 4.17ff.), order (taxis, 5.27–31), whether the work 
is genuine ( gnêsios, 5.32ff.), etc. For these features as a characteristic of the post-Hellenistic 
commentary tradition, see Mansfeld 1994.
55. The categories established here are provisional: they map out broad groups and indicate 
the diversity with which one individual source was used. One correlation which may pro-
duce an especially significant insight is that between length of quotation and (dis)agreement. 
A fuller discussion is in Baltussen forthcoming c.
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 Alexander provides a helpful exegesis of Aristotle. This type of use entails agree-
ment and shows Simplicius looking to his predecessor for enlightenment 
in understanding or clarifying Aristotle’s arguments. Late commentators 
will not always claim a clarification as their own (a topos), but often the 
consultation of an authority is genuine (see also next point) and will lead 
to further discussion of possibilities and textual details. A similar use of 
clarifications originally made by Aristotle’s pupil Eudemus can be found 
in Simplicius (Baltussen 2002b); and it is of particular interest to note 
that references to Eudemus and Alexander actually occur close together 
a considerable number of times, with Alexander building on Eudemus’s 
interpretations. (This forms part of certain source clusters in Simplicius.) 
Eudemus, called “lover of truth” a number of times (e.g., 1024.6), is often 
preferred to Alexander.
 One passage must suffice to illustrate the typical case. At Commentary 
on Aristotle’s Physics 434.36, the position of Aristotle on physical change is 
supported by Alexander’s comments, which are brought in without quali-
fication: “Now he [Aristotle] wishes to provide clear examples of things 
reciprocally changed in initiating it [i.e., change] and at the same time, 
as Alexander says, to separate off the divine body from being reciprocally 
changed and affected.” Such brief interjections (“as Alexander says”) are 
frequent and often signal agreement: a practice that exemplifies the argu-
ment from authority which became so common in medieval times.
 Alexander is brought in to back up Simplicius’s argument and/or to counter the 
view(s) of others. This type, again based on agreement, resembles an argument 
from authority in that Alexander’s view is invoked for confirmation and/
or is placed in opposition to that of others. One case of Simplicius coun-
tering rival views with the help of Alexander is found at 521.10. Here tôn 
palaiôn, “thinkers of old,” are opposed to the neôteroi, “moderns, upstarts,” 
a contrast already popular in Galen. An exceptional case, somewhere in 
between the previous two examples, is found at 1358.39–40 against Philo-
ponus. Here Simplicius defends Alexander against an attack by “the Gram-
marian” (line 39), accusing Philoponus of misunderstanding Alexander:
The Grammarian should have noticed that Alexander did not here investigate 
how the finite fixed sphere is eternal, but how, being finite, it possesses an infi-
nite power of causing motion. (Translated in McKirahan 2000: 149)
56. For appeal to authority see, e.g., Eudemus fr. 59 with Wehrli’s comments, in which 
Theophrastus is mentioned as having more authority: closeness to the master may indicate 
higher authority.
57. Additional examples at 582.21; 584.4. Cf. the correction of “his beloved Iamblichus” 
(Chase 2003: 8, n48), who also misunderstood Alexander.
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In this case, a correct understanding of a text is made the basis for offer-
ing clarifications, defending one authority against another. As Jonathan 
Barnes (1992: 270) tersely comments, “Clarity is a virtue, obscurity a vice.” 
Simplicius’s polemic against Philoponus conforms to an established con-
vention of exegesis (Hoffmann 1987). Here the strategy is to portray the 
opponent as an inferior exegete: he has misunderstood a passage (Alexan-
der’s interpretation). Two things stand out: (a) the emphasis on text and 
its polysemy, and (b) Simplicius now uses a secondary text, making this 
polemic a tertiary feature, in which previous interpretations become part 
of the overall discourse of how to understand Aristotle.
 Alexander’s view is criticized and/or rejected but quoted anyway. In a con-
siderable number of cases, we find Simplicius quoting Alexander with 
expressed disagreement. In terms of presentation, he does not seem to have, 
so to speak, a “principle of economy or concealment,” which might have 
induced him to keep references to views he disagrees with very brief—
that is, to quote dismissively and suppress the evidence. Such a procedure 
would allow a critic to present only as much material as will serve for a con-
vincing refutation of the opponent. Simplicius has been accused of using 
such an approach unfairly regarding Alexander, on the basis of recently 
found marginalia of a Paris manuscript, and in this case that verdict seems 
justified (Rashed 1997). But other cases show that this assessment should 
not be generalized: even by modern standards, there is some merit to this 
practice. It is plausible to ascribe the “redundant” quotations to respect 
for Alexander’s status. One good example of such a quotation is found 
in 449.6ff.0 It cites several lines from Alexander’s text, and then Simpli-
cius squarely contradicts it (449.11–12: “I, however, believe it to be . . .”). 
In another celebrated example, during the debate on the eternity of the 
world, Simplicius unwittingly preserves parts of Philoponus’s Against Aris-
totle (Wildberg and Furley 1988).
 Alexander is quoted or mentioned in connection with a variant in the manuscript 
tradition. Although this can happen within any of the three categories men-
tioned above, I have added this as a distinct class of references, because it 
provides us with detailed information on the scholarly method of Simpli-
cius and the text constitution of Aristotle (see notes 50–51).
 In sum, Alexander plays a very important role in Simplicius’s commen-
tary, either as authoritative interpreter and guide (second-level authority) 
58. There is a notable parallel to this attitude in later commentators of the early Renais-
sance (Fazzo 1999: 48).
59. These important fragments are from Alexander’s lost commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics.
60. See also 407.21–28.
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or as a source for ammunition against Simplicius’s own rivals. That he 
is also criticized shows Simplicius to have a mind of his own, despite his 
heavy reliance on others. Yet most of the time he seems to keep up the 
pretence (the topos of modesty) of merely passing on wisdom and insight 
from his predecessors (Sluiter 2000: 200). His use of a rich archive and his 
scholarly method seem to indicate that his works did not originate in the 
classroom, even if they may have been intended for it (cf. Praechter 1929).
5. Toward a History of Ancient Philosophical Commentary
In this highly selective account, I have argued that exegesis as a generic 
concept provides a useful starting point for understanding the emergence 
of philosophical commentary. Even before it became commonplace for 
philosophers to engage texts in an extensive and detailed manner, we can 
identify components of interpretation, and these eventually became part 
of formal commentary (first century BC?). Examination of this evidence 
allows us to obtain a more complete grasp of the tradition’s organic devel-
opment and push the chronological origins further back, shedding light 
on the “prehistory” of the exegetical tradition (Grondin 1994). This evolu-
tionary argument focuses on polemic as an important constituent of exe-
gesis, proposing that disagreement can become a litmus test to determine 
the level of responsiveness and interpretive effort present in polemical 
argument.
 Unclarity in expression or ideas (whether real or imagined) requires 
clarifying semantic or conceptual shifts. Allegorical exegesis of Homer 
also shows that changing circumstances might generate attempts at find-
ing “new” meaning in an important text in order for it to remain relevant. 
But although clarification is always part of the motivation, commentary is 
rarely an aim in itself: even Homeric allegorizing readings became part 
of the debate on religion and the new science of nature (see Derveni in 
Betegh 2005). Thus, “religion, science and the invention of literary criti-
cism were inextricably linked” ( Janko 2002–3: 15). From the postclassi-
cal era onward, commentary is not merely parasitic upon philosophy, it 
is philosophy. It is an exercise in understanding the works of the school’s 
founder with the further aim of understanding the world. Authority plays 
a major role here, and many commentaries simply present their activity as 
a natural extension of the school founders, with Plato and Aristotle as the 
prime examples of worthy authorities (Sluiter 2000). Over time, “authori-
ties” multiply in exegesis. But the further we move away from the source, 
the less likely it is that the original text will be openly challenged.
 The growth in sophistication of exegesis was influenced by the increasing 
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spread of literacy, which initially prepared the way for linguistic changes, 
such as the use of the article to signify abstract notions that had been pre-
viously expressed in concrete terms (Snell 1953 [1948]: 227–36). In a pre-
dominantly oral culture, a fluid and flexible attitude toward the “text” is 
accompanied by a comparable attitude toward its meaning; a literate cul-
ture encourages readers to “fix” or settle the meaning of the written text in 
a way that is comparable to (and suggested by) the fixity of the text itself, 
thus increasing the possibility of dispute over the text’s meaning and inter-
pretation. The first clear signs of a clash between the old oral attitude and 
the new literate one can be found in Plato (Havelock 1963), who expresses 
deep reservations about written philosophy in the Phaedrus (274b–276a), 
and in Aristotle, whose literal interpretations of the Presocratics earned 
him reproach for “distorting” their views. With hindsight, it is easy to see 
that Aristotle’s interpretation of earlier views is highly context-dependent, 
but he should be judged against his own aims. Like the Sophists, Plato, 
and even the Presocratics themselves, Aristotle was part of a dialogical 
mode of philosophizing at a time when the boundaries and conventions 
of genre were rather diffuse. His intention is clearly not to distort the views 
he presents but to understand his predecessors within the framework of 
his own system of concepts (e.g., Metaphysics 1069a24–25). It was not so 
much a matter of Aristotle trying to fit the proverbial “square peg into a 
round hole” as it was an expression of confidence in his own ideas and his 
lack of interest (and perhaps skill) in producing a historically responsible 
interpretation of ideas which were quite remote from his own (Cherniss 
1935, 1944). Having made certain advances conceptually, he could regard 
views of the past with a degree of intellectual contempt. His model of 
epistemological progress (a kind of sociology of science avant la lettre) sees 
humankind in a cooperative undertaking, moving toward the truth by a 
joint effort (Metaphysics 980a21–982a1, 993a30–b8).
 Henceforth, philosophical progress would be determined by a complex 
set of factors: new work would involve self-consciously embedding one’s 
intellectual activity within a recognized tradition (philosophy) which was 
understood as a cooperative undertaking geared to finding the truth while 
exploring the meaning(s) of existing views on the truth. Commenting on 
others is thereby subordinated to the quest for knowledge and understand-
ing, and the conveying of truths, once they have been established, would involve 
teaching by way of commentary. Every period would have its “own” Plato 
or Aristotle, and commentary becomes part of that process of renewal 
61. Laws are often written down in the wake of the introduction of script (Hammurabi, ca. 
1792–1750 BCE, codifies existing laws) or the Greek alphabet (Draco, 621–620 BCE).
62. E.g., by Cherniss 1944; McDiarmid 1953.
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(Gerson 2005). The label “Neo-Platonism” fails to take this into account, 
operating with a flawed notion of traditional “purity.” In the scientific tra-
dition (e.g., Hipparchus, Galen), commentary embodies a conception of 
philosophy as a continuous dialogue with the past, intended to correct 
mistakes and to extract, as von Staden (2002: 115) calls it, “a transepochal 
scientific ‘truth’.” In the Platonic tradition, the commentary is a deliberate 
means to preserve continuity with the past and to pass on an “established” 
philosophical truth. The syncretistic nature of both strands of the com-
mentary tradition evolved gradually and did not present insurmountable 
problems (if it was considered at all). An analytical, ahistorical retrospect 
on this tradition does not produce a proper appreciation of this dynamic 
process. In this essay, I have tried to capture the dynamic evolution of 
commentary by tracing the tradition from its preconditions to its mature 
form.
 From “etymology,” analogy, and allegory to semantic amplification and 
doctrinal appropriation, this Protean progression gathered strength and 
sophistication over the centuries and culminated in the mammoth writings 
in which first- and second-level authorities vie for attention. The ancient 
philosophical commentary, formal or nonformal, is thus not so much a 
deliberate choice of “genre” as a natural by-product of this ongoing dialogue 
with pupils and colleagues, past and present. The sheer volume of the works 
arising from it, with their multifarious chorus of voices in multilayered 
documents of unprecedented length, may surprise us. Yet because these 
commentaries often have an overarching aim or narrative (a “plot,” as von 
Staden [2002: 118] calls it), which avoids the irksome features of modern 
commentary, such as fragmentation, parallelomania, the reference-book 
function (Gibson 2002), many can stand on their own feet as valued and 
valuable contributions to science and philosophy.
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